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THE FINALITY OF PARTIAL ORDERS IN CONSOLIDATED
CASES UNDER RULE 54(b)
INTRODUCTION
The losing party in any civil litigation generally has a right to appellate
review.' The right to appeal provides an aggrieved party with an oppor-
tunity to reassert the justness of his cause and permits judicial self-cor-
rection.2 Appellate review also satisfies a basic need for uniformity, and
facilitates the development of new law.3
Congress has given the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final judgments.4 Determining when a judgment is final is
critical because the right to appeal depends upon it. If a judgment or
order is not final, but rather interlocutory, an appeal can only be taken
with the aid of some other statutorily or judicially created appellate
mechanism.5 Because appeals must be filed within a certain time,6 the
right to appeal could be lost if a litigant mistakenly believes a judgment is
not final. Absent an ascertainable threshold of finality, 7 numerous pre-
mature appeals could be filed as protective measures to retain the right to
appeal,' thus clogging up the courts and diverting judicial attention from
more deserving matters. A comprehensive definition of a final, and thus
appealable, judgment, however, has proved to be elusive.9
1. See R. Martineau, Modem Appellate Practice § 1.1, at 8 & n.9 (1983). The
Supreme Court, however, has refused to find a due process requirement of appellate re-
view in civil cases. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); see also R.
Martineau, supra, § 1.6, at 18 (noting Court's refusal). In fact, the Court stated that "the
right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary
ingredient of justice." Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325.
2. See R. Martineau, supra note 1, § 1.6, at 18-19.
3. See id. at 19.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The final judgment rule provides, in pertinent part,
"[t]he courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States." Id.
5. See Ronel Corp. v. Anchor Lock of Fla., Inc., 312 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir.), aff'd
on other grounds, 325 F.2d 889 (1963), cert denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Wallace Prods.,
Inc. v. Falco Prods., Inc., 242 F.2d 958, 959 (3d Cir. 1957); infra notes 51-53 and accom-
panying text.
6. See Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984); 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2781, at 6 (1973). The Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure specify a time frame within which an appeal must be filed in order to be
timely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)l. This time period begins to run from the entry of a
final judgment. See R. Martineau, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 27.
7. See generally Carrington, Toward A Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47
Law & Contemp. Probs. 165 (Summer 1984) (suggesting statutory revisions of appellate
rules to clarify finality); Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context,
47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157 (Summer 1984) (arguing need to revise rules of finality/
appealability); Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 171, 172 (Summer 1984) (recognizing need for change but criticizing
Carrington and Cooper views).
8. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3901, at 399
(1976).
9. A final judgment has been defined as "one which ends the litigation on the merits
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The problem of determining finality is compounded when cases are
consolidated, producing a unique conflict between federal judicial policy
and the rights of individual litigants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(a) permits consolidation of cases involving common questions of law
or fact.10 Consequently, consolidation, an old and familiar tool of the
courts, 1 facilitates judicial efficiency by avoiding duplicative litigation. 12
Although the policies underlying the finality requirement and consolida-
tion are the same-achieving maximum efficiency without sacrificing
fairness to the litigants 13-the application of the final judgment rule to
consolidated cases creates conflicting results. 14
At times, judgments or orders are issued in consolidated actions that
entirely resolve fewer than all of the original actions involved in the con-
solidation. 5 These orders are called partial orders, 6 and appeals from
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in
the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 89, 90 (1975). There has been a great deal of
litigation to establish a definition of finality for different situations. Various orders have
been tested for finality through the taking of an appeal. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 8, § 3909, at 440-41; see, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956) (grant
of dismissal of indictment); Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967)
(order denying injunctive relief but permitting pursuit of claims for damages); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (order dismissing class action but per-
mitting litigation of individual claims), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
10. Rule 42(a) states:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs
or delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Consolidation may be for less than all purposes. See 9 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2382, at 257 (1986); Comment, Consolida-
tion in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373, 376-77 (1963).
11. The rule was originally codified in the Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 21. For
a brief history of consolidation, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432-
35 (1956); Comment, supra note 10, at 373-74 n.2.
12. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2380; Comment, supra note 10, at
373-74.
13. Compare infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing the consolidation
balancing test) with notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the
final judgment rule that ensure effective review).
14. See Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1987) (partial
orders never final), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2883 (1988); Ivanov-McPhee v. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (partial orders may be final); Kraft, Inc. v.
Local 327, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 683 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (partial
orders always final).
15. See, e.g., Hageman v. City Investing Co., 851 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1988); Trinity
Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2883
(1988); Kraft, Inc. v. Local 327, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 683 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam).
16. For purposes of this Note, partial orders are only those that entirely resolve fewer
than all of the original actions that have been consolidated. While the term partial order
may have other meanings in the law, those alternative meanings are not relevant to this
analysis.
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these orders are called partial appeals. As a threshold issue, courts clash
over whether partial orders are categorically final and thus immediately
appealable under the final judgment rule found in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.17
Some courts hold that partial orders are always final and immediately
appealable because consolidation is an efficiency measure which has no
effect on the original actions. 18
When a partial order is not deemed automatically final, courts disagree
whether a partial order may be final. In other words, courts disagree
whether Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which per-
mits appeals from orders involving multiple claims or multiple parties,
applies to partial orders and, if it does apply, whether it governs partial
appeals.19 Some of these courts hold that partial orders may be final,20
depending on the nature of the cases and the extent of the consolida-
tion.21 These courts make finality determinations on a case-by-case basis.
Other courts hold that partial orders are never final.22 These jurisdic-
tions treat consolidated actions as one single action. Therefore, no order
is immediately appealable under section 1291 until all pending claims are
resolved.23
This Note examines the appealability of partial orders. Part I of this
Note describes consolidation, analyzing the language and policy of Rule
42(a), and advocates the treatment of consolidated actions as one single
action within the terms of the consolidation order. Part II discusses ap-
17. Some courts have held that a partial order may be final. See Hageman, 851 F.2d
at 71; Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F.2d at 930. Others have held that a partial order is interlocu-
tory. See Trinity Broadcasting, 827 F.2d at 675; Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703,
704-05 (9th Cir. 1984); State ex rel Pacific Intermountain Express, Inc. v. District Court,
387 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1963). Still others have held that a partial order is final. Kraft,
683 F.2d at 133; In re Massachusetts Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F.2d 439, 441-42 (lst
Cir. 1972).
18. See, eg., Kraft, 683 F.2d at 133; Massachusetts Helicopter, 469 F.2d at 441-42.
19. Compare Trinity Broadcasting, 827 F.2d at 675 (54(b) always applicable to partial
orders) and Huene, 743 F.2d at 705 (same) with Hageman, 851 F.2d at 71 (rebuttable
presumption that partial orders are not final and 54(b) applies) and Ivanov-McPhee, 719
F.2d at 930 (applicability of 54(b) determined on case-by-case basis).
Rule 54(b) permits appeals from actions involving multiple claims or multiple parties.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). For a general discussion of Rule 54(b), see infra notes 72-89
and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Hageman, 851 F.2d at 71; Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F.2d at 930; Ringwald v.
Harris, 675 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 451
F.2d 985, 987 (3d Cir. 1971).
21. Consolidation may be for less than all purposes. See supra note 10; infra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Trinity Broadcasting, 827 F.2d at 675; Huene, 743 F.2d at 705; State ex
rel. Pacific Intermountain Express, Inc. v. District Court, 387 P.2d 550, 552-53 (Wyo.
1963).
23. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (decided under prede-
cessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, previously codified at 28 U.S.C. § 228 as amended by 28
U.S.C. § 225 (a)); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S.
24, 28 (1883) (same); Mack v. United States, 274 F.2d 582, 584 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 916 (1959). For a discussion of the final judgment rule, see infra
notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
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peals generally, with emphasis on the final judgment rule, and concludes
that partial orders are interlocutory, not final and appealable. Part III
analyzes Rule 54(b) to determine its limitations and its applicability to
consolidated actions. This Note concludes that partial orders are not
final within the meaning of section 1291 and that Rule 54(b) should gov-
ern the appeal of partial orders in the absence of some other appellate
mechanism.
I. CONSOLIDATION
Consolidation permits the joining of cases involving common ques-
tions of law or fact for some or all purposes.24 Consolidation takes three
forms:25 as a stay,26 as a merger device, 27 and as a way in which all ac-
tions are united procedurally, but retain their separate identities.28 This
Note focuses on the third type of consolidation, by far the most fre-
quently used. 9
Consolidation can be requested by any party to the litigation or may be
ordered sua sponte by the court;3 0 the consent of the parties is not re-
24. See supra note 10; infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
25. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2382, at 254. These three forms
developed out of the rule as it was originally codified in the Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, 3
Stat. 21. See Comment, supra note 10, at 373 n.2.
26. In this form all actions save one are stayed until the trial of that one. Judgment in
one action is conclusive as to the others. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 2382, at 254. For example, in one action, a motion to consolidate was granted because
common questions of law or fact were involved. See Masterson v. Atherton, 223 F. Supp.
407, 409-10 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1964). The consolidation was
conditioned on one action being decided prior to the other. See id. at 410.
This, however, is not a true form of consolidation because nothing is joined. Rather, a
stay is issued to avoid duplicative litigation. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 2382, at 254; see, e.g., Lipp v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 290 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835 (1961); Boots Aircraft Nut Corp. v. Kaynar Mfg.
Co., 188 F. Supp. 126, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
27. In this form, several actions are combined into one, eliminating their separate
identity and creating a single action in which one judgment is entered. See 9 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2382, at 254 n.10; see, e.g., Roden v. Empire Printing Co., 135
F. Supp. 665, 667 (D. Alaska 1955) (due to merger, attorney fees were allowed for only
one action), aff'd, 247 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1957). This type of consolidation is relatively
uncommon. Cf 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2382, at 255 (case law pro-
vides only for consolidation with retention of separate identities).
28. This form exists when several actions are ordered to be tried together but each
retains its separate character and requires entry of a separate judgment. See Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933) (decided under predecessor of Rule 42(a));
see also 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2382, at 255 (identifying this as most
common form). Suits are not merged into a single action and parties in one do not be-
come parties in another. Such "consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and
economy in administration." Johnson, 289 U.S. at 496.
29. Rule 42(a) authorizes all three common law uses of consolidation. Only the third
type of consolidation, however, is regularly used, primarily because of courts' reliance on
the Supreme Court's leading decision concerning consolidation in Johnson v. Manhattan
Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933). See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2382, at 255.
30. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2383, at 259.
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quired.31  Consolidated actions should be treated as one procedural
unit.32 Although this may increase the potential for unfairness, 33 tailor-
ing consolidation orders34 will maintain fairness to the litigants while
maximizing judicial efficiency. 35 Fairness is further ensured by the pro-
cess that a district court must follow to order consolidation.36
To order consolidation, the district court must perform a balancing
test to determine whether the actions involve similar questions of law or
fact such that consolidation would be appropriate. 37 The efficiencies to
be achieved by consolidation must be weighed against the possible incon-
venience, delay, expense and prejudice to the parties involved.38 For ex-
31. See American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Fair, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 236, 237 (N.D. Ill.
1963).
32. See Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 808 F.2d 133, 136
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2901 (1988).
33. For a limited discussion of unfairness see infra note 38.
34. See Comment, supra note 10, at 377; cf. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 2382, at 257 (consolidation may be for less than all purposes).
35. Cf. Comment, supra note 10, at 376-77 (limiting consolidation is compromise be-
tween extremes of granting consolidation for all purposes and denying consolidation
altogether).
36. While there is some indication that all courts do not perform the balancing test as
they should, see Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 1973), this does not pres-
ent an incurable problem. Cases which have been consolidated can be severed pursuant
to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the discretion of the district
court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), particularly if one party would encounter unfair preju-
dice. See Garber, 477 F.2d at 717; see also 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 2387, at 277 (42(b) intended to further convenience, avoid delay and prejudice, and
serve the ends of justice). Additionally, where appellate rights are concerned, Rule 54(b)
should act as a safety valve, permitting an appeal from partial orders where the pre-
consolidation balancing test may not have been properly performed. See infra notes 72-
89 and accompanying text. Of course, there may be other applicable appellate mecha-
nisms pursuant to which a party may successfully bring an appeal. See infra notes 51-53.
37. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2383, at 259-61; Comment, supra
note 10, at 374-76. Consolidation is proper if a denial of consolidation would violate the
principles of multiparty litigation administration, including minimizing confusion, dupli-
cation and delay. See Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1251, 1253
(D.R.I. 1969); Comment, supra note 10, at 377. Consolidation would also be advisable
where a denial of consolidation would protract the existence of virtually identical actions
that were originally filed in different jurisdictions. See Thomas v. Deason, 317 F. Supp.
1098, 1099 (D. Ky. 1970); Tiernan, 295 F. Supp. at 1255.
38. See Stein, Hall & Co. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 264 F. Supp. 499, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Unfair delay might result when the common issues between the cases to be consoli-
dated are not central to the litigation, such as the assertion of common defenses. Each
party would have to sit through lengthy proceedings of little or no relevance to its own
action, increasing the costs and delaying the resolution of each action. In such a situa-
tion, consolidation would not be appropriate. See Maschmeijer v. Ingram, 97 F. Supp.
639, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Unfair prejudice could ensue from combining cases in which the various plaintiffs have
conflicting interests because certain parties would be unable to assert all of their claims.
This would be inequitable and prejudicial; thus the consolidation should not be ordered.
See DuPont v. Southern Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 958 (1967).
Consolidation is generally encouraged by the courts and is used unless the negative
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ample, consolidation of a relatively new action with one that is ready for
trial would be inappropriate.3 9 Such a consolidation would stay the lat-
ter action while discovery and pretrial proceedings in the newer action
were completed, thus unfairly delaying further proceedings in the older
action.' The balancing test therefore considers the possible disadvan-
tages to the parties as a matter of course before consolidation is ordered.
II. APPEALS AND THE APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. Background
Congress has empowered the courts of appeals to hear appeals only
from final judgments4 1 to avoid piecemeal litigation and to promote judi-
cial efficiency. 2 As noted above, the courts of appeals can hear an ap-
peal prior to a final judgment only if there is a rule, statute, or judicial
ruling creating an exception.43 The parties involved in an action cannot
confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals by consenting to finality.44
The modem form of the final judgment rule combines considerations
of effective review45 with guidelines sufficiently clear to prevent the great
effects of its use, such as those mentioned above, would outweigh the potential benefits.
See id. at 195-96.
39. See Borup v. National Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 807, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
40. See id.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see supra note 4.
A final judgment or decree is one that terminates the litigation on the merits so that in
case of affirmance the trial court will have nothing to do but to execute the judgment or
decree it originally entered. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Southern Express
Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1883).
This appellate authority vested in the courts of appeals was codified in the first Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83-87. See Crick, The Final Judgment as
a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 549 n.48 (1932) (providing history and development
of final judgment rule).
42. See Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 306, 318 (1830); see also Forgay
v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 205 (1848) (purpose of Rule is to prevent unnecessary
expense and delay). This philosophy of judicial economy underlying the right to appel-
late review was formally adopted with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, in which the purpose of the Rules is stated as being to "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Furthermore, Congress'
actions were motivated, in part, to prevent the use of interlocutory review as a tool for
harassment. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); Note, Appealabil-
ity in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 351 (1961). The avoidance of partial
appeals and the denial of unnecessary interlocutory review is designed to effect the most
rapid determination of litigation. See Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324-25; Forgay, 47 U.S. at
205.
43. See Ronel Corp. v. Anchor Lock of Fla., Inc., 312 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir.), aff'd
on other grounds, 325 F.2d 889 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Wallace Prods.,
Inc. v. Falco Prods., Inc., 242 F.2d 958, 959 (3d Cir. 1957).
For a discussion of the legislative and judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule see
infra notes 51-54, 72-89 and accompanying text.
44. See Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 755 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1254 (1986); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Fed-
eral Practice & Procedure § 2660, at 121-22 (2d ed. 1983) (in keeping with policy that
parties cannot confer appellate jurisdiction by failing to object to a jurisdictional defect).
45. Generally, effective review is considered to be review that provides an aggrieved
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waste that could result from protective appeals46 and litigation over ap-
pellate jurisdiction.47 Yet, in order to provide effective review, the final
judgment rule must be construed practically rather than technically.4" A
technical construction of the final judgment rule could result in gross
unfairness to the parties, including loss of the right to appeal.49 At times,
piecemeal litigation may be required to ensure fairness to the parties in-
volved despite the general judicial dedication to the avoidance of piece-
meal appeals. 50
Recognizing this potential for unfairness, Congress and the Supreme
Court have created several exceptions to the final judgment rule.51 As a
result, certain types of appeals can always be taken, regardless of the
party with an opportunity to reassert the justness of his cause, permits judicial self-cor-
rection, satisfies a basic desire for uniformity in the district courts, and facilitates the
development of new law. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3913, at 523;
supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
46. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3913, at 523. Protective appeals are
appeals taken only to ensure that the right to appeal is not lost. See supra notes 6-8 and
accompanying text.
47. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3913, at 523. Because so many
types of orders have been tested for finality, the boundaries of finality are becoming in-
creasingly clear. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290-91 &
n.4 (1940) (order permitting addition of new parties is interlocutory); EEOC v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 506 F.2d 735, 742 (3d Cir. 1974) (orders permitting limited intervention
are inherently interlocutory); NAACP v. Michot, 480 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1973) (or-
ders denying consolidation are interlocutory).
48. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see also Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) ("A pragmatic approach to the question of
finality has been considered essential to the achievement of the 'just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action': the touchstones of federal procedure." (footnote omit-
ted)); 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3913, at 522 ("finality requirement
should not be applied as a sterile formality, but should instead be applied pragmatically
with an eye to fulfilling its underlying purposes").
One case, Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848), "provided the first secure
basis for interpreting the final judgment requirement flexibly in order to alleviate the
hardship that may result if orders... cannot be reviewed until entry of the clearly final
order." 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3910, at 453.
49. This point is discussed in several cases that construed the final judgment rule
practically to avoid unfairness to the litigants. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1978); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545
(1949); Forgay, 47 U.S. at 204-05; United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962); see also infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text
(discussing exceptions to the final judgment rule).
50. Permitting piecemeal appeals, while less efficient, safeguards fairness to the liti-
gants by providing a right to appeal that will satisfy the goals of appellate review. See
supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. Piecemeal appeals are appropriate when a subse-
quent right to appeal would serve no purpose, such as if the issue were moot. See, e.g.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306-08 (1962) (divestiture order final
despite need for court approval of divestiture plan; extent of order not contested, merely
court's power to issue order); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507,
513 (1950) (affirming as final an order denying intervention despite continuing litigation,
party wishing to intervene kept out of litigation if right to appeal is denied); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (order refusing to apply state
statute was final; immediate appeal required to permit effective review).
51. See Redish, supra note 9, at 90 n.9.
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traditional meaning of finality, pursuant to these legislatively5" and judi-
cially created exceptions. 3 While these rules may run contrary to the
52. Section 1292(a) involves a very limited set of exceptions to the final judgment
rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982). The three specific types of interlocutory orders
which might be immediately appealable under this section are: 1) orders involving in-
junctions; 2) orders involving receivers; and 3) decrees affecting the rights and liabilities
of the parties in admiralty cases. See id. In 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) and (d), Federal Circuit
appeals and Court of International Trade and Court of Claims appeals are addressed.
Section 1292(b) permits interlocutory appeals of orders that involve a controlling ques-
tion of law and contain substantial grounds for a difference of opinion. An appeal from
the order in question must have the capacity to advance materially the termination of the
litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. VI 1988). This is a double-discretion-
ary standard; the district court must, in its discretion, determine that an order meets the
elements of section 1292, then the appellate court has discretion to decide whether to
hear the appeal. See S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, 5255, 5257; 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3929. This
double-discretionary standard is designed to ensure that only truly deserving appeals are
heard. See Note, supra note 42, at 379. This is not a broad alternative to the final judg-
ment rule; the exception is limited in its application by the court and is not meant to
provide an opportunity to circumvent finality. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 609 & n.12 (1975).
Another legislatively created exception to the final judgment rule is The All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982), which permits a court of appeals to issue extraordinary writs
giving it jurisdiction over the action and power to hear an appeal. See Note, supra note
42, at 375; see, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (mandamus to decide
new, important questions of law); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)
(writs to exercise supervisory control over district courts). The writs are highly discre-
tionary, and only gross abuses of trial court discretion, creating a likelihood of irreparable
harm, can be remedied in this manner. See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus
Under the All Writs Act, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 595, 595-96 (1973).
53. Judicially created exceptions are generally very similar to each other. See Huck-
eby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1977). These exceptions
prevent undue prejudice or irreparable harm to the litigant that might result from the
requirement of awaiting final adjudication of all pending litigation before an appeal can
be taken. See id. at 547-49; see also 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3907, at
433-34 (courts manipulate definition of finality to permit appeals where balancing of in-
jury possible from delay and danger of inefficient litigation so warrants).
The most commonly used judicially created exception to the final judgment rule, the
Cohen collateral order doctrine, treats as final all interlocutory orders regarding collateral
issues. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949). The
Court set out four criteria which must be met before an interlocutory order is appealable:
1) the decision must finally determine a claim of right; 2) the claim must be separate from
and collateral to the rights asserted in the action; 3) the claim must be too important to be
denied review; and 4) the claim must be too independent of the cause of action to require
deferral of appellate consideration. See id. at 546-47.
Another judicially created exception is the Forgay doctrine, which requires an order of
near finality and a situation in which delay would render a later appeal of little value. See
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204-06; Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555
F.2d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 1977).
Under the Wood doctrine, the denial of a temporary restraining order is a final and
appealable order because denial of the restraining order was held to be similar to a dis-
missal of a claim for relief. See United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 776-78 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). The order determined substantial rights of the
parties which would be lost if review was delayed until final judgment. See id. at 778.
The death knell doctrine provides that if orders, when considered together, terminate
the litigation just as effectively as a single order to dismiss the action entered by a trial
FINALITY OF PAR TIAL ORDERS
goals of judicial efficiency, they serve the important countervailing goal
of preserving fairness to litigants.5 4
B. The Finality of Partial Orders
Partial orders present a unique problem in finality because they impli-
cate the strong policies underlying Rule 42(a). Partial orders, by defini-"
tion, only arise in consolidated actions. Consolidation is permitted to
maximize judicial efficiency, and the balancing test performed by courts
prior to ordering a consolidation ensures that efficiency is not achieved at
the expense of fairness to the litigants.
Despite this balancing and the purpose of the final judgment rule to
avoid piecemeal litigation, some courts hold that partial orders are al-
ways final and immediately appealable. 5 For example, the First and
Sixth Circuits rely on a case decided in 1933, Johnson v. Manhattan Rail-
way, 6 in which the Supreme Court held that original actions which have
been consolidated retain their separate identities.5 7 Under this separate
identity approach, a partial order that completely resolves at least one
original action is always final.
Johnson, however, is easily distinguished from the finality issue58 be-
cause Johnson did not involve any questions of finality. In that case
consolidation was ordered by the district court in an effort to simplify the
litigation, to elucidate the status of other pending actions and avoid the
potential disorder of a collateral attack in an already complex lawsuit. 9
It was in holding the consolidation improper that the Supreme Court
court judge, the court should hear the appeal. See Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 473
F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973).
54. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 8, § 3907, at 433-34; Crick, supra note
41, at 553; Redish, supra note 9, at 90-91.
55. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Caledonia Inv. Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 380-
81 (1st Cir. 1988); Kraft, Inc. v. Local 327, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 683 F.2d 131, 133
(6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); In re Massachusetts Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F.2d 439,
441-42 (1st Cir. 1972).
56. 289 U.S. 479 (1933).
57. See id. at 496-97.
58. Johnson did not involve any issues of finality, see id., but rather involved disputes
over the appointment of receivers. See id. at 483. The derivative suit, filed by a share-
holder on behalf of himself and all shareholders, demanded the appointment of receivers
and called upon the court to hear both cases. The court, wishing to vacate orders in both
suits, ordered the consolidation of the matters because it was unsure whether an order to
vacate issued in one could affect the collateral suit. See id. at 494. Consolidation clarified
the status of the pending actions and eliminated any possible confusion from the collat-
eral attack. The Supreme Court, in holding that the consolidation was improper, stated
that "consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administra-
tion, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties,
or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another." Id. at 496-97 (footnote
omitted). This is known as the separate identity theory.
59. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 1 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 61 F.2d 934 (2d
Cir. 1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 479 (1933).
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first revealed the separate identity theory that now governs
consolidation.'
The language and purpose of consolidation, the federal policy against
piecemeal appeals, 61 and the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure62 do not support the application of Johnson's separate identity
theory in this context. The policies underpinning Rule 42(a), particu-
larly that of maximizing judicial efficiency, 63 urge treating original ac-
tions as one procedural unit.64
Moreover, no unfairness to the litigants is created and no rights are
lost when a partial order is considered interlocutory. Any possible un-
fairness, additional delay and expense have already been considered prior
to consolidation and deemed outweighed by the benefits of judicial effi-
ciency, the avoidance of duplicative litigation, and the benefits to some of
the litigants to have all of the related actions tried together.65
In the event that all factors were not properly balanced prior to consol-
idation,66 or that circumstances have sufficiently affected the pending ac-
tions to warrant an immediate appeal, Rule 54(b) should act as a safety
valve to provide for an appeal where one would not normally be permis-
sible under section 1291.67
A partial order, issued in a consolidated action resulting from a thor-
ough district court balancing of fairness and efficiency factors, is interloc-
utory, and not immediately appealable. The parties still have a right to
appeal, but it is not triggered until all pending actions in the consolida-
tion are resolved. 68 If the delay would prove prejudicial or unduly detri-
mental to the party desiring an appeal, the party can petition for an
appeal under Rule 54(b), or any of the other applicable appellate
mechanisms.69
60. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933).
61. This extension of the separate identity theory frustrates the federal policy against
piecemeal appeals by allowing plaintiffs to put all claims in separate complaints and then
consolidate them. See Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 565-66 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1988). The plaintiff would then benefit from the efficiencies of consolidation, yet
would be able to appeal an adverse judgment in each claim even while other claims are
still pending. See id. Therefore, appeals should await the issuance of a final judgment
resolving all pending claims.
62. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure advocate the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
63. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of Rule 54(b) and the factors considered in a 54(b) certification
analysis, see infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
69. For a brief discussion of other appellate mechanisms, see supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Rule 54(b) see infra notes 72-89 and accompany-
ing text. For the basic elements of a 54(b) certification and fairness analysis see infra note
80.
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III. THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE 54(B) TO PARTIAL ORDERS
Courts disagree whether Rule 54(b) always applies to partial orders.7"
Because consolidated actions clearly fall within the language of the rule,
either as "an action" or because multiple parties are involved, Rule 54(b)
should invariably apply to appeals from consolidated actions, particu-
larly partial appeals.7 1
A. Rule 54(b)
Rule 54(b), which is equally applicable to orders and judgments,72 al-
lows appeals from actions involving multiple claims or multiple parties
when fewer than all pending claims are resolved.7 3 Rule 54(b) serves the
often countervailing interests of judicial economy and fairness to the liti-
gants.74 The purpose of 54(b) is to balance the benefits of accelerated
70. Compare Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1987)
(54(b) always applicable to partial orders), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2883 (1988) and
Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1984) (same) with Hageman v. City
Investing Co., 851 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1988) (rebuttable presumption that partial orders
are not final and 54(b) applies) and Ivanov-McPhee v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 719
F.2d 927, 930 (7th Cir. 1983) (applicability of 54(b) determined on case-by-case basis).
71. Analyzing the language of the rule, specifically "[w]hen more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, ... or when multiple parties are involved," Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b) (emphasis added), suggests that Rule 54(b) multiple parties or multiple claims must
appear within a single action. However, "action" refers only to "more than one claim for
relief" and does not limit multiple parties to appearance in a single action. This is be-
cause "[r]eferential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention ap-
pears, refer solely to the last antecedent." 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 47.33 (4th ed.
1984). Based on this rule of the last antecedent, the singular "action" should be con-
strued to apply only to the words preceding it, and should not be interpreted as extending
to or including others more remote. Thus, any combination of actions containing multi-
ple parties, including consolidated actions, potentially falls within the terms of the Rule.
72. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 44, § 2660, at 116-17 (citing
Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 343 F.2d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 1965)).
73. Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim,... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however des-
ignated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)..
74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment).
Rule 54(b) was created to avoid the possible injustice of delay resulting from delaying
the appeal of a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of the entire case. See id.;
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of
the United States by Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 433,
472-73 (1946) [hereinafter Report of Proposed Amendments]. Rule 54(b) was also de-
vised to counteract the greater potential for unfairness which arises through liberal join-
der rules. See id. at 472-73. Such unfairness might include additional costs incurred as a
1989]
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review against the waste and hazards of piecemeal litigation,75 not to
overturn the longstanding federal policy of discouraging piecemeal litiga-
tion.76 Consequently, the Rule does not supplant the use of any other
statute controlling appellate jurisdiction."
An appeal under Rule 54(b) requires what is known as certification.
In this certification process, when confronted with an order resolving
fewer than all pending claims in an action, a district court must make an
express statement of finality and the lack of a just reason for delay.78 A
balancing test is used to determine whether certification is appropriate.79
The district court must ask if certifying the finality of the judgment ad-
vances the interests of sound judicial administration and justice to the
litigants.80
The Rule implicitly directs the court to make reasonable accommoda-
tion between the policy of limiting normal appellate jurisdiction to re-
view of final judgments, and problems of timing of review."1 The court
result of delay, loss of right to appeal due to mootness, or other forms of hardship which
might be caused by delay. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S.
1, 5, 10-12 (1980); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Fore River Ry., 861 F.2d 322, 325 (1st Cir.
1988); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th
Cir. 1988); Allis-Chalmers v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 366 n.14 (3d Cir.
1975).
75. See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445
(7th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note (1946 Amendment);
Report of Proposed Amendments, supra note 74, at 472-73.
76. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note (1946 Amendment); Report
of Proposed Amendments, supra note 74, at 472-73.
77. See Meyer v. Indian Hill Farm, Inc., 258 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1958); 10 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 44, § 2658, at 72.
78. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). In effect, the district court must expressly state that a
particular order is final and spell out the reasons why an appeal is permissible immedi-
ately, and need not await the resolution of all pending issues. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller
& M. Kane, supra note 44, § 2655, at 40-41.
79. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 5 (1980); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445-46 (7th Cir. 1988).
80. The key elements to the balancing test are: 1) whether certification would result
in unnecessary appellate review; 2) whether the claims to be adjudicated are separate,
distinct and independent from any others; 3) whether review of the claims would be
mooted by future developments; 4) whether the nature of the claims is such that no appel-
late court would have to decide the same issues more than once, even with subsequent
appeals in the same action; and 5) the general considerations of justice to the litigants,
including financial implications, undue delay, prejudice, and any other relevant factors.
See, eg., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980); Allis-Chal-
mers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
81. The Supreme Court, in a leading Rule 54(b) decision, stated that
[w]ith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there came an increased opportu-
nity for the liberal joinder of claims in multiple claims actions. This, in turn,
demonstrated a need for relaxing the restrictions upon what should be treated
as a judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction .... [Sound judicial
administration] demonstrate[s] that at least in multiple claims actions, some
final decisions, on less than all of the claims, should be appealable without wait-
ing for a final decision on all of the claims. Largely to meet this need, in 1939,
Rule 54(b) was promulgated ....
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cannot, however, in exercising its discretion, "treat as 'final' that which is
not 'final' within the meaning of § 129 1.''s2 The status of a party or
claim must be entirely resolved to allow appeal even under 54(b).83 Be-
cause the district court is in the best position to explore all facets of the
case and perform this balancing test, 4 it has the sole discretion to deter-
mine the finality of an order.8
Appellate courts may review ,certification orders to be sure that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting ceitification 8 6 This
appellate review ensures that the district court's evaluation is scrutinized
to prevent unnecessary, piecemeal appeals.8 7 If no abuse of discretion is
found, the appellate court gives substantial deference to the certification
decision of the district court.88
Partial orders are interlocutory and thus require the use of some appel-
late mechanism before an appeal can be taken. 9 Rule 54(b) can and
should be applied to partial orders to determine whether certification and
subsequent appeal would be appropriate.
B. Application of 54(b) to Consolidated Actions
1. Case-by-Case Approach
Some courts adopt a flexible approach in applying Rule 54(b) to partial
orders.9" These courts make finality determinations on a case-by-case
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432-33 (1956) (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 437. The order under consideration for certification must be a decision
upon a claim for relief and must be final in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of
an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claim action. See id. at 436.
Just as the court cannot expand its jurisdiction, the parties to the litigation cannot
expand the jurisdiction of the court by consenting to finality. See supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
83. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1976); see supra notes
41-44, 74.
84. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1980); Trinity
Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2883 (1988); Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984); State ex rel.
Pacific Intermountain Express, Inc. v. District Court, 387 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1963)
(analyzing federal rules).
85. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 44, § 2660, at 114-15 (discuss-
ing the need for the district court to certify orders); id. at 124 (certification is matter of
district court discretion).
86. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10; Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1443-44 (7th Cir. 1988).
87. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10; Indiana Harbor, 860 F.2d at 1445-46.
88. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10. This deference and high standard of review
stems from the fact that the trial court is in the best position to order certification. See
supra notes 84-85.
89. Cf. Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1987) (par-
tial orders are not categorically final), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2883 (1988); Huene v.
United States, 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1984) (partial orders not final; 54(b) certifica-
tion required).
90, See, e.g., Ivanov-McPhee v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 927, 929-30
(7th Cir. 1983); Ringwald v. Harris, 675 F.2d 768, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Den
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basis and hold that the nature of the cases involved and the extent of the
consolidation can be determinative.9 When consolidation is for less than
all purposes, these courts reason that certification might not be required
because the original actions could still be considered stand-alone suits in
which all claims have been resolved.92 This reasoning, however, suffers
the same deficiencies as that of courts which permit immediate appeal of
all actions involving partial orders.93 Unfortunately, a suit involving an
appeal from a partial order in a consolidation clearly for less than all
purposes has not yet arisen in the circuits adopting this rationale. Thus
this scheme has not been tested, and the inadequacies of the plan have
not yet become obvious.
Courts following the flexible case-by-ease approach require the circuit
court to perform an analysis virtually identical to the certification analy-
sis required pursuant to Rule 54(b).94 This approach ignores the fact
that the district court, not the circuit court, best knows the reasons be-
hind, and the extent of, the consolidation,95 and is in the best position to
evaluate the situation.96 Finally, this approach provides no clear stan-
dard for the litigants, and may frequently cause untimely filings for
Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 451 F.2d 985, 986 (3d Cir. 1971) (order in case where consoli-
dation not for all purposes is probably final) (dicta).
91. See, e.g., Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 1988);
Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 822 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 1987); Ivanov-
McPhee, 719 F.2d at 930; Ringwald, 675 F.2d at 770-71; Jones, 451 F.2d at 987 (dictum);
cf. Hageman v. City Investing Co., 851 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1988) (a strong presumption
against finality, rebuttable by "unusual circumstances").
92. See, e.g., Bergman, 860 F.2d at 564; Sandwiches, Inc., 822 F.2d at 709-10.
93. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
Treating partial orders as final when a consolidation is less than total may defeat the
purposes for which the actions were consolidated. For example, Rule 42(a) advocates
treating consolidated actions as one procedural unit. This can best be accomplished by
treating partial orders as interlocutory. If actions were improperly consolidated or if
there is some need for an immediate appeal from a partial order, it should be taken pursu-
ant to one of the existing exceptions to the final judgment rule, particularly Rule 54(b),
which, by its terms, is applicable to partial orders.
94. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (elements of a 54(b) certification
analysis). In 54(b) decisions, as in the case-by-case finality decision, prejudice to the liti-
gants is balanced against the interest of sound judicial administration. Compare notes 75-
85 and accompanying text with supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
For example, the finality factor looking at the relationship between the claims, see
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), is quite similar to a
factor in the Ivanov-McPhee analysis, that considers the nature and relationship of the
claims involved. See Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F.2d at 930. The factor looking at mootness
considered in a practical determination of finality, see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, is, essen-
tially, the analysis being applied by the court of appeals according to Ivanov-McPhee. See
Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F.2d at 930. The remaining factors of a certification analysis as laid
out by Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3rd Cir.
1975), all go to judicial efficiency and fairness to the litigants. These are also components
of a practical finality determination under Cohen. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
95. See Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2883 (1988); Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir.
1984).
96. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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appeal.97
Alternatively, the courts following the flexible approach reason that
when a consolidation is for all purposes, Rule 54(b) applies and certifica-
tion is required before an appeal will be heard.98 These courts distin-
guish actions consolidated for less than all purposes, stating that the
extent of the consolidation may be dispositive.99 Despite distinguishing
the possible determinative impact of the extent of consolidation, these
courts uniformly require 54(b) certificationl10 Although the courts say
54(b) may apply, in reality, 54(b) always applies. The case-by-case ap-
proach is thus inefficient and contrary to the Federal Rules.
2. The Certification Approach
Courts following this approach require certification pursuant to Rule
54(b) for partial orders unless another appellate mechanism is avail-
able. 10 This approach comports with Rule 54(b), 102 the policies under-
lying consolidation, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the
policies supporting Rule 54(b) advocate a requirement of certification for
a partial order to be appealable. Because the rule was not intended to
overturn the well-settled federal rule prohibiting piecemeal disposal of
litigation, appeals are permitted only from final judgments, except in spe-
cial instances covered by statute or other appellate mechanism.
10 3
Second, interpreting a partial order to be final and appealable under-
mines the goal of consolidation to move cases forward as one procedural
97. See Huene, 743 F.2d at 704. This result undercuts judicial efficiency because the
litigants cannot predict, with uniformity, how the courts will rule on the finality of any
partial order where the consolidation was for less than all purposes. See supra notes 7-9
and accompanying text.
98. See Ivanov-McPhee v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 927, 928-30 (7th Cir.
1983); Ringwald v. Harris, 675 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1982).
99. See, e.g., Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F.2d at 929; Ringwald, 675 F.2d at 770-71; Jones v.
Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 451 F.2d 985, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1971).
100. See, e.g., Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 567 (3rd Cir. 1988);
Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F.2d at 930; Ringwald, 675 F.2d at 771. These courts have, in each
case, performed a balancing test, and found that the rights of the litigants were not
threatened by a certification requirement. Perhaps this is because the rights were pro-
tected by the balancing test performed before consolidation.
101. See Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2883 (1988); Huene, 743 F.2d at 705; cf. State ex rel Pacific Inter-
mountain Express, Inc. v. District Court, 387 P.2d 550, 552-53 (Wyo. 1963) (analyzing
state rules virtually identical to Fed. R. Civ. P.); see supra notes 51-54 (brief discussion of
alternative appellate mechanisms).
102. See Report of Proposed Amendments, supra note 74, at 472-73; see also Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 5 (1980) (determining the appropriate
standard for granting 54(b) certification).
103. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text; supra notes 72-77 and accompany-
ing text.
As noted earlier, this should not present any unfairness because the right to appeal is
not lost. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Furthermore, if unfairness or
prejudice might result, the parties have the opportunity to petition for 54(b) certification,
or may take advantage of the other exceptions to the final judgment rule. See supra notes
50-54 and notes 73-78.
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unit because the procedural unit is fragmented by the partial appeal. "
Third, the extent of consolidation should have no effect on the appeal-
ability of partial orders. A limited consolidation permits the litigation of
similar issues, thus securing the benefits of consolidation without encoun-
tering the complexities that might arise from trying dissimilar issues to-
gether. 10 5 The common issues for which the actions were consolidated,
however, should be capable of parallel treatment. 106 Treating partial or-
ders within a limited consolidation as final would defeat the purpose for
which the actions were consolidated. Furthermore, fairness and econ-
omy are weighed by the district court before any consolidation is
ordered. 107
This certification approach is consistent with the purpose of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that the rules "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."' ' While the justness of the certification requirement cannot be
assumed in every case, the fairness issues are weighed prior to consolida-
tion and again in a certification determination, thus providing dissatisfied
parties ample opportunity to assert their cause.10 9
CONCLUSION
The courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to hear a partial appeal from a
judgment in a consolidated action that completely resolves fewer than all
of the original actions, absent 54(b) certification or the use of some other
appellate procedure. This finding is compelled by the language of Rule
54(b), and by the policies underlying the final judgment rule, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the general federal policy of avoiding
piecemeal litigation.
Marianne Fogarty
104. One court has stated:
An appeal prior to the conclusion of the entire action could well frustrate the
purpose for which the cases were originally consolidated. Not only could it
complicate matters in the district court but it also could cause an unnecessary
duplication of efforts in the appellate court.
Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984); see also State ex rel. Pacific
Intermountain Express, Inc. v. District Court, 387 P.2d 550, 553 (Wyo. 1963) ("[T]here
may be certain individual advantages to the separate determination of matters but these
do not outweigh the step that was purportedly taken for the best administration of justice
in consolidating the litigation."); see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
105. See Comment, supra note 10, at 377; supra notes 32-40.
106. See Comment, supra note 10, at 377.
107. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
108. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
109. Litigants have the opportunity to put their special interests before the court in the
consolidation and certification decisions. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,
446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980); supra notes 33-38, 75-82 and accompanying text. Ultimately, a
litigant can also have the appellate court review consolidation and certification decisions
for abuse of trial court discretion. See supra notes 41-43, 87-89 and accompanying text.
In this manner the rights of the litigants are amply protected.
[Vol. 57
